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Kumpulan tiedekirjasto
Topic:
-This thesis addresses the problem of comparing payos from iterated games of varying lengths in a
meaningful way. Shorter games can be played more often than longer games in same amount of time.
Direct comparison of payos per game therefore leads to systematic error for the shorter games.
On the other hand if it is dicult to nd a playing partner, shorter games have extra disadvantage
and per game payo calculation is more accurate. This thesis calculates payos as time averages
instead of per game averages taking into account rate of nding a new playing partner.
-Games can be of dierent lengths because of random termination of the game or by a strategic
choice of the player. Latter case is known as quitting strategy, which is given in the form of a quitting
rule as a part of a players strategy, e.g. "quit after two subsequent rounds with low payo". Quitting
can prevent further losses in a single iterated game, but becomes more eective when a player can
start a new game with another opponent after quitting in a game. Opponents are randomly chosen
from a pool of potential players and after the termination of a game they are returned to the pool
to be paired o randomly again. This is called "pooling". The strategies utilized by the players in
the pool change over time as strategies with longer games become more rare in the pool.
-Quitting traditionally has not been considered a strategic choice.
Method:
This thesis constructs a model for iterated games with quitting and pooling. Then it is explored
further with an example of iterated Hawk-Dove-Bully-Retaliator (HDBR) game.
Results:
- Strategies that tend to lead to long games become less frequent in the pool than strategies with
shorter games.
- Greedy strategies, when pooled with quitting strategies, will eventually spend most of their time
playing against each other or in the pool. This reduces their payos to the point that they are no
longer competitive compared to more altruistic strategies.
- High termination rate increases the relevance of the rst few rounds. This causes more greedy
strategies to benet from high termination rate when more naive or altruistic strategies cannot play
in benecial games for long.
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Introduction
Two by two matrix games have been studied by number of authors [1] [3] [5]. Matrix
games give players option to play either option A or option B. Then each player is given
payo according to payo matrix. Strategy in a game are xed instructions on how to
choose what to play. Replicator equation [2] and payos given to the strategies are used
to see if a strategy will increase or decrease in density in the population of strategies.
In iterated games each strategy plays multiple rounds against same opponent. I add
quitting, pooling and random game terminating event to the iterated games. Quitting
is usually not considered a valid strategy, but in this thesis it is considered part of the
strategy space. Quitting rule allows some strategies to leave unfavourable games before
they lose too much. Pooling is a new construction that solves asynchronosity in iterated
games and allows strategies to favour shorter games. Random game terminating event
is usual to avoid innite games and to take into account that no game lasts forever in
reality.
Iterated games count payo per game, which gives wrong estimation of shorter games
payos. This thesis constructs a system called pooling to account for dierent length
games where shorter games might be played more often than longer games. Payos are
not calculated per game, but as time averages. Each strategy starts in a pool of strategies
and are paired at xed rate with other strategies to play a game at the end of each round.
Each game that ends has its playing strategies send back to pool to be paired again.
Pooled games allows strategies to quit quickly in detrimental games and to play against
new opponent instead of being stuck with a bad opponent or waiting for longer games to
end.
I will study examples of pooled games under Hawk-Dove-Retaliator-Bully game. These
results will be presented with new graphical tool to conveniently see ESS between multiple
strategies. I will also provide full classication of these Pairwise Invasibility Graphs (PIG)





We start with dening replicator equation as system of dierential equations





where Di is proportion of type i strategy in population, vector D = (D1, D2, . . . , Dn)
gives the distribution of types in the population, function fi(D) gives tness of type
i strategy against the population and function φ(D) is weighted average of population
tness. Additionally in this thesis we assume that total population size is always scaled
to 1.
To dene function f(D), we need to dene how tness function is determined. System
that determines values of function f has much faster dynamics than replicator equation
and thus we assume that at each time τ of replicator equation, system determining tness
has already reached its equilibrium.
1.2 Quitting strategies and asynchronous games
Usually deliberately quitting is not considered a strategy in two-by-two matrix games, but
here I assume that each strategy has some rule they follow to dene if they quit or not.
Rule may be as simple as 'never quit'. Quitting strategy should not depend on strategys
opponent directly, only on what the opponent plays each round.
Since not all games and rounds within are not necessarily same length, it brings a
problem of asynchronosity. I assume each round is roughly same length and each game
3
starts same time as new rounds start, then rounds are synchronous enough that I do
not need to think of half nished rounds at each step. In nature, we can assume each
round takes roughly a day and nights are rest periods where no games are played. This
means that rounds are asynchronous but each evening situation is always that at most
one round has been played per game and new rounds do not start until next dawn. Other
such periodic events might work for dividing rounds. See gures 1.1 and 1.2 for two ways
iterated games normally calculate payos.
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Time unit Time unit
Figure 1.1: Usually payo per player is calculated per game. In this graph each such
time unit is shown as big box. Games are marked with blue boxes and dotted lines show
how rounds are counted. As seen here, players with shorter games have a lot of idle time,
waiting for others to nish their games. This usually leads to underestimation of viability
of shorter games.
Time unit
Figure 1.2: This gure shows one way to calculate payo in iterated games. Each game
is marked in blue and dotted lines show when each round ends. In this kind of system
payo is usually calculated per round. This way leads to overestimation of payo from
shorter games, if it is not guaranteed to immediately nd a new game after previous ends.
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1.3 Dening pooled games
Strategies start in pool and are paired with other strategies to play a game. After each
round each game either ends or continues. If game continues, each strategy playing
advances to next round. Strategies whose game ended are returned to the pool and from
the pool new pairings are send to play new games. This system is then continued until
equilibrium is reached (which will take innite time).
Let Sn(t) be a density of free strategy n at discrete time t, fij maximum number of
rounds played between strategies i and j, Ghij(t) density of games on round h between
strategies i and j at time t. Let p ∈ (0, 1) be pairing probability and δ ∈ (0, 1) probability
that game continues after a round ends. Dynamical system is given by
Gnij(t+ 1) = δG
n−1
ij (t)(1.3)











and the initial conditions are∑
i,j,h






















































From this we can see that if strategy plays more games against itself (increasing fii), its
density of non-playing strategies (Si) must decrease. This means that other strategies will
be paired more rarely with this strategy as the density of free strategies is lower. This
sort of density manipulation by strategies does not happen without pooling and quitting.
1.4 Single strategy
With single strategy we have








1− p 1− δ 1− δ 1− δ . . . 1− δ 1
p 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 δ 0 0 . . . 0 0








0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
















which is a Leslie matrix. As nothing is added or removed from the system, means that
leading eigenvalue λ1 = 1 and eigenvector corresponding to stable distribution is
(1.15) (1, p, δp, δ2p, . . . , δfiip)>.
1.5 Two strategies











































































































which shows that when x0 is large, x is also large and of same magnitude. This means
that initially rare strategy in the population will be rare during the payo calculations.
This also indicates that game lengths with dierent strategies aect how their sizes in
population are accounted for. Knowing x, it is possible to calculate equilibrium mean per
capita payo to strategy i.
Let chij be payo to strategy i against strategy j on round h. Now We can calculate
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where ahij = δ
h−1chij. Using this we can calculate tness for strategy 2 against itself and
strategy 1. Payo against population mean in mixed population of strategies 1 and 2 to
strategy 2 is





































































We know that x/x0 converge to a constant when x0 →∞. From this we can conclude
that if strategy 1 is the resident (x0 → ∞) only games against the resident strategy
matter. Also it is important to note that without quitting x/x0 = 1. When p→ 0 we are
starting new games only when all the other games have ended. This means that x/x0 = 1
and we are back to regular invasion tness of single game in two by two matrix game. If
δ = 1 we require quitting strategy or each strategy will only play in games they are rst
assigned to and only repeated rounds matter. Opposite end is when δ = 0 where every
strategy is pure strategy as no second round of a game is ever played.
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Chapter 2
Single round HDRB game
2.1 Hawk-Dove-Retaliator-Bully game
We consider traditional Hawk-Dove game where each strategy chooses to play either Hawk
or Dove. Let C > 0 be the cost of ghting and V > 0 be the reward. Hawk versus Hawk
is seen as one is injured and pays the cost, while other takes the reward, multiplying both
by half gives us the average result. If Dove and Hawk meet, Dove gets nothing and Hawk
takes whole reward. When two Doves meet, they share the reward or each get it with
equal probability. [4] See gure 2.1. In single round Hawk-Dove game there are strategies
called Bully and Retaliator. Bully plays hawk against Dove but folds against Hawk and
plays dove. Bully against itself chooses hawk. Retaliator plays dove against Dove and
Retaliator strategies but plays hawk versus Bullies and Hawks.
meets Hawk meets Dove meets Bully meets Retaliator
Hawk V/2 - C/2 V V V/2-C/2
Dove 0 V/2 0 V/2
Bully 0 V V/2 - C/2 0
Retaliator V/2 - C/2 V/2 V V/2
Figure 2.1: Single round game of Hawk and Dove payos to all four single round game
strategies.
To calculate Hawk vs Dove game payos, let h be density of Hawk players and d be




h+ V d =
1
2
(V − C + d(V + C))








When they are at equilibrium, we know that they are equally viable, assuming solution
for d, if it is smaller than 0 dove cannot invade, as payo for dove players is less than for
the hawk players for all densities. Same reasoning for hawk, if d ≥ 1 hawk cannot invade.
Assuming two payos are equal and d, h ∈ (0, 1) we get condition











Bully versus Dove strategy is same as with Hawk versus Dove. Assuming similarly to
Dove versus Hawk calculations that b+ h = 1, where b is density of Bully strategies and




+ bV = b
V − C
2
hV − hC + 2V − 2hV = V − C − hV + hC







+ 1) > 1
V > C.
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Lets indicate density of Hawk strategies again with h ∈ (0, 1). Now we can see









V − C < hV − hC + V − hV
−C < −hC
h < 1.
Retaliator strategy versus Bully strategy gives us that retaliator strategy always has




+ (1− r)V > (1− r)V − C
2
rV + 2V − 2rV > V − C − rV + rC






Figure 2.2: P.I.G. without any invasion data.
2.2 Pairwise Invasibility Graph
Pairwise Invasibility Graphs or PIGs show quickly which strategy can invade which strat-
egy. See gures 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6. Each node in the graph corresponds to a
strategy and arrows indicate which strategies they can invade and which strategies can
invade them.
In gure 2.7 and in gure 2.8 Retaliator strategy is ESS, it cannot be invaded by
any of the other strategies. ESS is marked blue in each plot for clarity. Line between
Dove and Retaliator is dotted because neither have edge over another. Interesting part is
the triangle of Hawk, Dove and Bully strategies. When reward V is larger than cost of
competing C Hawk can invade the other strategies and it cannot be invaded by two others.
In this situation selshness is clearly the best option. However when cost of competing
goes up, every strategy (Dove, Hawk, Bully) can invade each other and coexist.
D H
Figure 2.3: Hawk can Invade, Dove cannot invade.
D H
Figure 2.4: Both can invade, leading to coexistence.
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D H
Figure 2.5: Hawk cannot invade, Dove can invade.
D H














3.1 PIGs and Pooled games
Next I build pairwise invasibility graphs (PIG) for Dove, Hawk, Retaliator and Bully
strategies in iterated games with pooling and quitting (pooled games). I assume Dove
and Hawk quit immediately after a Hawk strategy is played against them. Retaliator
and Bully do not quit the game. Dove as a game strategy is a strategy that always
chooses to play a Dove. Hawk likewise with Hawk. Retaliator game strategy is one that
starts playing Dove and copies whatever opponent played last round. Bully is a game
strategy that starts with Hawk, but switches to Dove if opponent plays a Hawk strategy
against them. It does not switch back to Hawk. When strategies face each other, if one
strategy would quit, game ends. For each pairing see gure 3.1. Retaliator and Bully
play dierently from single round game, but the behaviour is similar, retaliator escalates
if opponent does and bully starts with hawk but loses its will to ght if facing hawk.
f meets Hawk meets Dove meets Retaliator meets Bully
Hawk 1 1 2 1
Dove 1 1 ∞ 1
Retaliator 2 ∞ ∞ ∞
Bully 1 1 ∞ ∞
Figure 3.1: Game lengths in each match up.
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3.2 Hawk and Dove invasibility
Lets assume that Dove is the resident strategy and Hawk is the invading strategy. As





Eh − Ed = V r(h, d)−
V
2
1 + p r(h, d)




2(1 + p r(d, d))
(2r(h, d) + 2p r(h, d)r(d, d)− r(d, d)− p r(d, d)r(h, d))
We know from before that fdh = fhh = 1 and fdd → ∞. Now we have condition for
hawk invasion as







⇒ 2− 2δ + 2p− 1− p > 0
⇒ δ < 1 + p
2
.
This means that if games end quickly due to random event and large portion of strategies
are paired each step, hawk can invade. However for each pairing rate p exists δ ∈ (1+p
2
, 1)
such that Hawk strategy cannot invade, regardless of reward and punishment values of C
and V.
Now lets assume Hawk is resident strategy and dove is the invader. Using notation
from above and Sh(0) ≈ 1 and Sd(0) is small, we get
Ed − Eh = −
1 + p r(h, d)
1 + p r(h, h)
V − C
2
r(h, h) > 0
⇒ C > V,
which is the what is in single games used to prevent Hawk being the only viable
strategy. Additionally in single games Hawk can always invade Dove, which is not the
case in pooled games. In gures 3.2 and 3.3 pairwise invasibility is shown in parameter
space {p, δ}.
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Figure 3.2: Hawk and Dove invasion when C > V












Figure 3.3: Hawk and Dove invasion when C < V
3.3 Hawk and Bully invasibility
Now Hawk is the resident strategy and Bully is a invading strategy. Now Sh(0) ≈ 1 and
Sb(0) is small. Condition for Bully invasion is
17
Eb − Eh =
V − C
2
− 1 + p r(h, b)




This means that the rst ESS condition does not tell if Bully can invade or not. To
nd out if Bully can invade, we need to check second ESS condition. This means that
Bully invades Hawk population if Hawk cannot invade Bully.
Now assume Bully as resident Strategy and Hawk as the invading strategy. Now
Sb(0) ≈ 1 and invading Sh(0) is small. Invasion criteria is
Eh − Eb =
V − C
2
− 1 + p r(h, b)








⇒− pδC − δV > 0,
which cannot be satised. This means that Hawk cannot invade Bully and thus Bully can
always invade Hawk.
3.4 Dove and Bully invasibility
Set Dove as resident strategy and Bully as invading strategy. Now Sd(0) ≈ 1 and invading
Sb(0) is small. Bully invasion criteria is
Eb − Ed = V −
1 + p r(d, b)























which is the same as for Hawk invasion into Dove population.
Now assume Bully as resident strategy and Dove as the invading strategy. Now Sb(0) ≈
1 and invading Sd(0) is small. Invasion criteria is
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Ed − Eb = 0−
1 + p r(d, b)










V − C + δV
1− δ
< 0
δ < 1− V
C
.
Figure 3.4 shows that all possible invasion combinations are possible between the Bully
and the Dove strategies in parameter space {p, δ}.



















Figure 3.4: Bully and Dove pairwise Invasibility when C > 2V
3.5 Dove and Retaliator invasibility
Dove and Retaliator both only play dove and each plays for as long as possible, meaning
they are indistinguishable when playing against each other. As neither lls invasion
criteria they cannot invade each other. However they are not mutually exclusive either.
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3.6 Hawk and Retaliator invasibility
Set Hawk as resident strategy and Retaliator as invading strategy. Now Sh(0) ≈ 1 and
invading Sr(0) is small. Hawk invasion criteria is
Er − Eh = 0 + δ
V − C
2
− 1 + p r(h, r)




δ − p < 1,
which is always true for δ, p ∈ (0, 1).
Now assume Retaliator as resident strategy and Hawk as the invading strategy. Now
Sr(0) ≈ 1 and invading Sh(0) is small. Invasion criteria is
Eh − Er = V + δ
V − C
2
− 1 + p r(h, r)
1 + p r(r, r)
V
2
r(r, r) > 0
V p− δpC + V − δC − δV − δ2V + δ2C > 0
p(V − δC) > −V + δ(C + V ) + δ2(V − C)
at the extreme values of δ we have
p(V − C) > 3V, when δ = 1, which is false ∀p
pV > −V, when δ = 0, which is true ∀p
we also know that invasion criteria is a quadraticpolynomial of δ, which by mean value
theorem means that there is only one zero for each value of p in interval δ ∈ (0, 1). Figures
3.5 and 3.6 show how zero line moves in parameter space when ratio V/C changes.
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Figure 3.5: Hawk and Retaliator invasion when V
C
< 1
















3.7 Bully and Retaliator invasibility
Now assume Retaliator as resident strategy and Bully as the invading strategy. Now
Sr(0) ≈ 1 and invading Sb(0) is small. Invasion criteria is








− 1 + p r(b, r)






V + δ(−V − C) + δ2(−V + C) + δ3V > 0
(δ − 1)(δ2 + δC
V




− 1 < 0,
which, by mean value theorem, has a zero for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Now assume Bully as resident strategy and Retaliator as the invading strategy. Now
Sb(0) ≈ 1 and invading Sr(0) is small. Invasion criteria is











− 1 + p r(b, r)









(1− δ)2(V (1 + δ)− C) > 0



















Figure 3.7: Pairwise invasions for Bully and Retaliator strategies when V < C < 1.5V












Figure 3.8: Pairwise invasions for Bully and Retaliator strategies when 1.5V < C < 2V
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3.8 Pairwise invasibility graphs for pooled games
None of the invasion criteria in previous section depend on dierence V − C so we can
without loss of generality assume that V = 1 and vary value of C. I plot parameter space
p, δ for C = {0.5, 1.4, 1.47, 1.51, 1.75, 1.83, 3} to show all possible congurations for the
P.I.G.s. If an area in the plot is unmarked, it is included in previous plots. Pairwise
Invasibility Graphs have ESS strategies marked in Blue, in case of Retaliator and Dove
mix of those strategies is ESS. If only one of the Dove and Retaliator is marked with blue,
it means that strategy is ESS, but non-rare inux of the other strategy can cause the
population to become invadable by Hawk or Bully. See chapter 3 for structure of PIGs.
24





















Figure 3.9: C = 0.5. Each curve represents bifurcation parameter values where invasibility
changes. Invader is written on the left and resident on the right. See chapter 3 for more
detail on each line.

















Figure 3.10: C = 1.4, see gure 3.9
25



















Figure 3.11: C = 1.47, see gure 3.9















Figure 3.12: C = 1.51, see gure 3.9
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Figure 3.13: C = 1.75, see gure 3.9














Figure 3.14: C = 1.86, see gure 3.9
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Figure 3.17: Nine possible Pairwise invasibility graphs, numbering corresponding to gures





































Figure 3.18: Last seven possible (out of 23 total) Pairwise invasibility graphs, numbering





Pooled games add pooling and quitting rule to iterated games. Some pairwise invasibility
pairs are possible without pooled games, but many PIGs generated in this thesis are not,
most notably those PIGs that require quitting for viability. In iterated games without
quitting, Hawk can always invade Dove. In contrast pooled games show that Dove pop-
ulation can prevent Hawk invasion by using quitting rule. Quitting early against Hawk,
Doves make few invading Hawks pariahs, that play too rarely to gain payos for invasion.
Comparing single round PIGs 2.7 and 2.8 to pooled games PIGs the dierence in possible
congurations becomes even more clear.
If each strategy has same quitting round, pooled game invasion criteria between those
strategies are equivalent to single iterated game. This can be seen from equation 1.24. If
fij is constant for all i and j, the ratio x/x0 = 1. This means that pooled games require
quitting as part of strategies to be dierent from regular single iterated games.
In iterated games with quitting rule but without pooling, many pairwise invasions of
pooled games are possible. However some PIGs are not possible, for example gure 3.17
has PIG number 11. This Pairwise Invasibility Graph is not possible without pooling,
more precisely Hawk and Retaliator coexist with Retaliator being able to invade Bully
and Bully not being able to invade Retaliator. Individually each pair is possible without
pooled games, but to have each in same PIG requires to have both pooling and quitting at
the same time. This is because without pooling parameter space is {δ} and with pooled
games parameter space is {δ, p}.
Quitting strategies in this form assume that playing rst round of the game is either
unavoidable or trying to play is desirable in some way. It is easy to see that if a player keeps
playing game where it loses resources each time, it would be better for it to quit instead.
Assuming resources that are not accessible by individuals, but are by pair of individuals,
32
Hawk-Dove version of this game might be about what happens to the resource after it
has been gathered. This sort of competition might be basis for quitting in middle of the
game, despite there still being resource to be gathered.
4.2 Extensions
4.2.1 Meta-strategies
We can allow strategies to have meta-strategies, e.g. each meta-strategy would choose
(randomly or otherwise) their strategy at the start of each game. Players would not
change their strategies in between rounds, only between games. This would break each
game into multiple parts and adds some calculations, but as I dened the pooled game,
it allows for such generalization. These meta-strategies are no explored further in this
thesis.
4.2.2 Non-playing income
One thing I did not take into account is the eect of background income or non-playing
strategys income to the equilibrias and invasions. If we allow each strategy to have payo
























which for α = 0 gives pooled games as studied in this thesis.
4.2.3 Evolution of quitting rules
I dened HDRB-game to have xed quitting rules. In 3 hawk quits immediately after
facing another hawk, but if instead it quit with probability τ , which way would the
parameter evolve and in which populations? Lets dene hawk versus hawk contest as one
getting hurt and the other gaining whole the reward. If in pooled game Hawk instead
of quitting anytime it faced a hawk, it instead quit only if it did not get the reward. It
would be interesting to see which strategy fares better and in which conditions.
Pablov is a strategy that switches what it plays each time it gets too low payo for
the round. A quitting rule for this kind of strategy would probably be if its total payo
is too low it quits. How high or low should each limit be?
33
In this thesis Bully learns its lesson after rst hawk is played against it. Sneaky bully
strategy is where after n rounds Sneaky bully plays hawk to test its opponent. Evolving
quitting strategy on it could be about how many times it plays hawk.
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